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o5 1 s o s l s 1 § 3 . s - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
S S ! 8 ' a - ^ » l Oak Ridge. Tennessee 37830
i|flifll|f
* ~ < M f f ! ° ! f Presentation To Be Made At:
8. i 8 J3 ̂  S <| .2 ^ w
• ^ i ^ ^ i s l l ^ l 2 9 t h H n a a n Factors Society Meeting
i S o l S l g i i l D - Baltimore, Maryland
September 29 - October 3, 1985
•Research sponsored by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coaaission Office of Unclear
Regulatory Research with Oak Ridge National Laboratory operated by Martin
Marietta Energy Systeas, Inc. under contract *BE-AC05-ft4OR2140O with U.S.
Department of Energy.
WBTWIWTIOHOF TWS SOGUHSWt J» UNUM(1£0
HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW H » MUCLEA*" POKER PLANT
SEVERE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS
P. A. Rrois and P. M. l u t
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses work conducted to: (1) support the
severe accident sequence analysis of a nuclear power plant
transient based on an assessment of operator actions, and (2)
develop a descriptive model of operator severe accident
management. Operator actions during the transient are
assessed using qualitative and quantitative methods. A
function oriented accident management model provides a
structure for developing technical operator guidance on
mitigating core damage and preventing radiological release.
INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this project, which was
sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), were to: (1) support the
nuclear power plant severe accident sequence
analysis (SASA) program, and (2) develop a
descriptive model of operator response in acci-
dent management. The first goal was accomp-
lished by working with SASA analysts on the
postulated boiling water reactor (BWR) antici-
pated transient without scram (ATWS) at Browns
Ferry Unit One and providing a systematic
assessment of critical operator actions. This
assessment demonstrates potential contributions
to SASA analyses from human factors data and
methods. The second goal was accomplished by
developing a function orientad accident manage-
ment (FOAM) model, which serves both as a con-
ceptual structure for identifying needs and
deficiencies and as a method for developing
technical operator guidance in accident manage-
ment.
ASSESSMENT OF OPERATOR ACTIONS DURING ATWS
The purpose of this section is to discuss
the approach and results of both the qualita-
tive and quantitative human factors assessments
of operator actions during an ATWS. The human
factors assessment was focused to some extent
by concerns of SASA analysts in their accident
sequence analysis (Harrington and Hodge, 1984).
The SASA analysis considered operator actions
in the context of new symptom-based Emergency
Procedure Guidelines (EPGs). Because the EPGs
were still in the review process, both the SASA
and human factors analyses were limited to
using the best information available on the
EPGs at the time the analyses were conducted.
The following discussions describe the
EPGs with an identification of operator actions
critical to the progression of an ATWS, show
how these critical operator actions underwent a
systematic qualitative review, and summarize a
quantitative human reliability analysis (HRA)
of some of these actions.
Critical Action* In the BPG«
Event-based emergency procedures require
control room operators to first diagnose the
type of transient before taking corrective ac-
tions. The symptom-based EPGs attempt to
reduce the cognitive workload associated with
event diagnosis by having operators verify and
maintain the adequacy of important safety
functions. One advanta?s of an event-based
procedure, however, is that operators may
immediately relate causes and consequences of
off-normal conditions and subsequently act to
directly mitigate accident progression.
SASA analysts made the recommendation that
the emergency procedures for an ATWS be
separated from the EPGs. The human factors
analysis assisted in defining some of the
problems operators may experience with
instructions in the EPGs. One of these
problems is that certain operator actions
called for in response to an ATWS are
substantially different from actions appropri-
ate to other accidents. Some of these actions
are also contrary to operational practices on
which operators are trained. SASA analysts
noted their assumption that the signature of an
ATWS is so distinguishable that operators would
quickly diagnose the event and that a separate
ATWS procedure would expedite operator
response.
One specific example of a problem related
to an ATWS is the instruction in the EPGs to
manually lower and maintain reactor vessel
water level at the top of the active fuel (TAF)
in order to reduce power. For all other
accidents, low vessel level would be an
off-normal condition and the EPGs would
instruct operators to restore vessel level to
within more acceptable bounds.
From a human factors standpoint, the
instructions in the EPGs present some difficul-
ties for operators in relation to an ATWS.
However, the solution proposed by SASA analysts
to separate those instructions relevant solely
to an ATWS may or may not be entirely
satisfactory. Operator performance during a
transient would be based on several factors
including training and operator aids. These
factors and others should be considered across
a range of accidents before targeting th*>
restructuring of procedures to address problems
related to one specific accident sequence.
The identification of critical operator
actions was coordinated with SASA analysts.
Inputs to the selection process included: (1)
review of the EPGs, (2) consideration of
operator actions included in computer code
models used for accident sequence analysis, (3)
review of operator actions observed during
exercises of ATWS perturbations on the
full-scope Browns Ferry control room simulator,
and (4) review of an operator action event tree
(OAET) developed for an ATWS and based on the
EPGs (Brinsfield, Burns, McClymont, Mays, and
vonHermann, 1983). However, comparison of this
OAET with results from the SASA analysis
suggested several modifications, and a modified
OAET is shown in Figure 1.
Six operator actions were judged as being
critical to the ATWS sequence as follows:
1. Manual selection and insertion of
individual control rods given
complete failure of the reactor to
automatically scram.
2. Verification of conditions for use of
the standby liquid control (SLC)
system and initiation of poison
injection into the reactor vessel in
order to shut the reactor down.
3. Initiation of pressure suppression
pool (PSP) cooling by manual
operation of the residual heat
removal system in order to maintain
the PSP as a heat sink.
4. Control of reactor vessel pressure by
manually operating safety relief
valves (SRVs) before pressure
setpoints are reached for automatic
SRV actuation.
5. Operator control of coolant injection
systems in order to lower and
maintain reactor vessel level at TAP.
6. Emergency depressurization of the
reactor vessel in accordance with the
PSP heat capacity temperature curve
followed by control of low pressure
injection.
Qualitative Review
The qualitative review was based on
instructors' comments and analysts'
observations resulting from the simulator
exercises and on a task analysis using NRC task
analysis techniques (Burgy, Lempges, Miller,
Schroeder, Van Cott, and Paramore, 1983). For
each of the six critical operator actions, the
review included: (1) identification of
problems/constraints affecting operator
performance (e.g., human engineering
deficiencies in control room design), (2) a
description of performance required of the
operator and constraints to success, and (3)
possible solutions to the problems so as to
improve performance reliability (e.g.,
potential backfits to control room design and
identified training needs).
As an illustration of the qualitative
review, the operator action involving reactor
vessel water level control presents several
problems. For an ATWS, the EPGs instruct the
operator to lower and maintain reactor vessel
water level at TAF while the SLC system injects
a neutron absorber into the reactor. This
instruction conflicts with intuition and
training for virtually every other. accident
situation. Further, in the process of
executing this instruction, operators must rely
on level indicators which may be inaccurate,
have insufficient range, or are located on
distant panels, Operators may also experience
difficulty with use of the high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI) system because of
autc itic interlocks. Very briefly, the
performance description Includes the purpose of
this operator action, which is to provide a
temporary reduction in reactor power until
control rods or sufficient poison are inserted.
Human engineering deficiencies are that the
level instrumentation in the control room show
differences in their readings at different
reactor vessel pressures, that because range at
the bottom end for some indications is so
restricted operators must check other displays
for the vessel level, and that display
locations force operators to verbally relay
display readings to one another. The potential
loss of HPCI is due to a suction shift from
cool to hot water which eventually damages the
HPCI pump lube oil, and leads the operators
into a more difficult branch of accident
progression. Resolutions of these problems
would include: (1) providing operator
simulator training on ATWS conditions; (2)
introducing human engineering fixes of level
instrumentation, although operator use of a
safety parameter display system, once it is
installed, should alleviate many of these
particular problems; and, (3) inserting in the
EPGs an instruction that during an ATWS
operators should manually trip HPCI before it
fails so that it may be restarted at a later
point if necessary.
Quantitative HRA
The purpose of the quantitative HRA was to
provide some clarification of uncertainties in
operator response during an ATWS. The first
four of the six critical operator actions
seemed suitable for the HRA since there was
agreement among nuclear engineering analysts on
the steps comprising the actions.
One method used in the HRA was the
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction, or
THERP, which results in human error probability
(HEP) estimates (Swain and Guttman, 1983). The
THERP analysis provides some additional
understanding on how respective operator
actions were deterministically incorporated
into the computer code used by SASA analysts to
study ATWS. A second method used in the HRA
was the Operator Personnel Performance
Simulation (OPPS) computer model (Kozinsky,
Gray, Beare, Barks, and Gomer, 1984). The uses
of OPPS were to supplement the THERP analysis
and complement the SASA analysis by providing a
time-reliability estimate based on operator
actions during an ATWS.
For each of the four critical operator
tasks, a task analysis using the NRC task data
form (TDF) was completed. Inputs to the task
analysis included: (1) plant emergency
procedures, (2) videotapes of the simulator
exercises involving ATWS perturbations, (3)
computer records of operators' switch
manipulations and plant systems data collected
during the simulator exercises through the
Performance Measurement System (Kozinsky and
Pack, 1982), and (4) expert judgment of
operators.
The task analysis data were used to guide
selection of nominal HEPs from the THERP human
error data base. It is noted that the level of
refined task information provided in the TDFs
is typically more detailed than the level
called for in the THERP Handbook. A HEP
worksheet was developed to organize and
document the THERP analysis. Nominal HEPs were
modified to reflect effects from performance
shaping factors, such as stress, and from the
level of dependence among successive task ele-
ments. Modified HEPs comprising complete suc-
cess paths were used to calculate human failure
probabilities. Only actions for which errors
would contribute to system failure were
included in the calculations. Estimates of
HEPs and related uncertainty bounds for the
four tasks are shown in Table 1.
Supplementary assessment of operator
actions during an ATWS involved the OPPS
computer model. The OPPS model was programmed
in the SAINT (Systems Analysis of Integrated
Networks of Tasks) language (Wortman, Duket,
Seifert, Hann, and Chubb, 1978). OPPS times
the simulated control room crew progressing
through major phases of pre-alarm detection,
event diagnosis, execution of procedure steps,
and error recovery. Based on 1000 iterations
of simulated ATWS events, performance time for
completion of all safety related operator
actions averaged 33.4 minutes (minimum of 23.0
and maximum of 43.8 minutes). For comparison
purposes, SASA analysts in their baseline worst
case scenario for ATWS involving no operator
actions reported that containment failure would
occur at 36.8 minutes into the accident. This
corresponds to about 85th percentile in the
OPPS distribution. The analysis suggests that
most operators should have sufficient time to
complete all actions necessary to shut the
reactor down. Moreover, not all safety-related
actions would have to be completed within this
time period since the more critical actions
which would likely be performed early in the
sequence would slow accident progression and
extend the time remaining for the operators to
complete the remaining actions.
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
The FOAM model was developed both as a
conceptual structure for systematically
describing operator response in accident
management and as a method for standardized
development of technical guidance supporting
operator decision making and response.
Guidance is necessary because accident condi-
tions are assumed to exceed the scope of exist-
ing emergency procedures. Technical guidance
may be developed through expertise compiled
from operations, engineering, and human factors
personnel and integration of data from SASA and
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) studies.
This guidance is central for extending
emergency procedures, systematic operator
training, and defining information requirements
for computer-based operator aids.
Some industry and commercial training
courses already exist for mitigation of core
damage. Some progress has also been reported
by the French nuclear power industry for the
prevention of severely degraded core conditions
(Tanguy, 1983). However, what seems to be
lacking is a systematic technical guide for
standardizing and linking operator training,
emergency procedures, emergency response
facilities, and other considerations important
to emergency response.
The FOAM model was developed, then, as a
function-oriented approach for translating
existing data and knowledge on accident
phenomenology into technical operator
guidelines. The FOAM model consists of four
components. Each component is subsequently
described and exercised through a demonstration
severe ATWS scenario that was assessed by SASA
analysts.
The first component is an assessment of
the accident sequence with an identification of
particular operator and/or system failures.
The purpose of this assessment is to define the
progression of the event and the potential end
states resulting in core damage. An OAET is
one method for identifying possible operator
errors leading to a severe accident. For the
demonstration ATWS scenario, the multiple fail-
ures of manual control rod insertion and initi-
ation of the SLC system would lead to end state
18, although end states 14, 16, and 20 could
also be considered depending upon the timing
and success of other operator actions. Poten-
tial dominant causes for these failures have
been identified through SASA and PRA studies,
and it is noted that this scenario is a very
unlikely event.
The second component involves a transla-
tion of the multiple failures identified in the
first component using a functional classifica-
tion developed to identify plant safety func-
tions and control requirements. The functional
classification was developed to identify
hierarchical levels of safety functions and
control requirements for both protection of the
plant and protection of plant personnel and the
public. One of the purposes of the translation
is to identify potential alternate control
requirements using redundant systems which
would recover the off-normal safety function.
The functional classification is intended to be
a technical guide for extending symptom-based
procedures which link safety functions, control
requirements, and redundant plant systems
(Corcoran, Finnicum, Hubbard, Musick, and
Walzer, 1981). A significant point is that
when the functional classification does not
identify redundant control requirements to meet
the particular off-normal safety functions,
i.e., when the multiple failures exceed the
scope of the emergency procedures, the opera-
tors must develop one or more "unconventional
emergency responses" (UERs) to either recover
the failures or minimize/isolate their effects
to plant safety. Specifications of UERs may
use such resources as SASA analyses and recom-
mendations, expert judgments from operations,
engineering, and human factors personnel, and
results of PRAs. Relative to the demonstration
ATWS scenario, only insertion of control rods
or poison provides stable shutdown of the reac-
tor. SASA analysts reported that manipulating
reactor vessel water level would extend acci-
dent timing by several hours. During this
time, operators must recover at least one of
the failures or take additional actions to
further extend the timing of the accident.
The third component concerns modeling the
UERs which the operator may devise for attempt-
ing to mitigate severe accident progression.
For purposes of the FOAM model, UERs are
modeled in an event tree format. End states
may be class if fect^according to expected possi-
ble plant conditions, and come end states may
necessitate identification of additional UERs.
Each UER may be qualitatively assessed to
systematically identify a range of information
which, at the minimum, should include: (1)
alarms and cues reflecting off-normal critical
safety parameters associated with the system
failure, (2) decision criteria such as
identifying and weighing alternate UERs, (3) an
analysis of specific operator actions at some
level of detail to either recover the failure
or isolate its effects, and (4) consequences of
the UER to the plant in terms of contribution
to accident mitigation or extension of the
timing of accident progression.
For the demonstration ATWS scenario, an
event tree containing potential UERs is shown
in Figure 2. The first two UERs pertain to the
safety function of controlling reactivity, and
recovery of either of the two failures will
shut the reactor down by inserting negative
reactivity. Recovery of these failures would
depend upon their particular failure modes.
SASA analysts and operations personnel have
also suggested that the timing of accident
progression may be extended through certain
unusual operator actions. The remaining three
UERs have been suggested as possible candidate
UERs for protecting containment. Initiation of
PSP sprays serves to protect containment by
controlling torus temperature and pressure.
Replenishing the PSP volume supports these same
safety functions by replacing heated torus
water with river water. The UER of opening one
main steam isolation valve (MSIV) is relevant
only to the ATMS perturbation in which all
efforts to insert negative reactivity are
unsuccessful. This UER could only be consi-
dered if certain conditions existed (e.g., no
fuel damage has occurred, technical limits of
containment are severely challenged), and would
then use the main condenser as a heat sink.
End states in Figure 2 are classified according
to a qalitative logic. In general, it would be
desirable to assess all these actions in suffi-
cient detail to develop corresponding technical
operator guidelines.
The fourth component of the descriptive
model involves operator response to fuel damage
and potential subsequent radiological release
past plant protective barriers. Beyond the
mitigation of core damage, the greatest hazard
to the health and safety of plant personnel and
the public is the release of fission products.
Challenges to multiple barriers may occur along
liquid and gaseous streams. As part of the
model, fission product pathways are identified
through detailed barrier diagrams tailored to
the BWR ATWS, and a sample diagram is shown in
Figure 3. Accompanying the barrier diagrams is
a system description identifying such
information as: (1) how fission products may
breach plant barriers and be subsequently
released to the environment, (2) the
information (alarms and recorders) available to
the control room operators for assessing
whether a barrier has been violated, and (3)
the possible actions the operator may take to
Mitigate a barrier breach and isolate the
radiological release.
Potential applications of the FOAM model
reflect regulatory, industry, and research per-
spectives. For each of these groups, the model
provides guidance for structuring technical
data and expertise and for formulating poten-
tial requirements in order to improve respons-
iveness to degraded core conditions. The FOAM
model provides a structure for applications in
accident management, including extended proce-
dures development, training objectives and per-
formance standards, technical support of
emergency response facilities, guidelines for
computer aids development and evaluation, and
assessment of control room instrumentation and
layout.
CONCLUSIONS
Results of this human factors study have
fallen into two major categories. First, human
factors support of the SASA program has pro-
vided some resolution of uncertainties in
operator response to severe accidents. Video-
tapes of the ATWS simulator exercises were
notably useful to SASA and human factors analy-
ses. Second, the descriptive FOAM model has
suggested a structure for developing technical
guidance for operator responses in mitigating
core damage and preventing radiological release.
The model provides a functional approach for
standardizing procedures and training for acci-
dent management using operations, engineering,
and human factors data and expertise.
Human factors support of other SASA stud-
ies is recommended to more thoroughly identify
and assess operator actions affecting the acci-
dent sequence. Assessments of operator
reliability, procedures, training, computer
aids, and human engineering aspects of control
room design are recommended to provide
comprehensive assessments of the operator's
contribution in the accident sequence.
Further work in accident management should
attempt to provide technical support for opera-
tors to mitigate degraded core conditions. The
FOAM model is one approach for standardizing
and extending procedures and training. Addi-
tional work is recommended to more comprehen-
sively apply results from SASA and PRA studies
to support NRC, industry, and research needs in
accident management.
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Figure 2. Unconventional emergency response event tree for ATWS
following failures of aanual control rod insertion and SLCS initiation.
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Figure 3. Pathways for release of
radionuclides in liquid streaa from a
BNR during ATwS.
Table 1. Estimates of Htwan Failure
Probabilities for Selected Tasks Daring ATMS
Task Description
Uncertainty Bounds
Nominal HEP Upper Lower
Manually operate SRVs







for and initiation of SLC
injection
2.72E-02 2.6JE-01 1.74E-02
1.82E-01 3.71E-01 1.63E-01
1.27E-01 3.28E-OI 3.92E-02
3.69E-02 2.59E-01 1.47E-02
